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A Tale of Two Systems? Success and
Failure in a Single Information System
Implementation
Catherine Middleton, York University, Toronto, Canada
Introduction
This paper presents a case study of an information system (IS)implementation in a new
university. A successful implementationwas anticipated but was not achieved. The
designers were satisfiedwith the system but secondary users were dissatisfied and
frustratedby restricted system access. An examination of the university'sculture and
management structure reveals strong political reasonsfor the primary users to exert power
over the secondary users.Markus's (1983) interpretation of interaction theory is used
todiscuss the political implications of the system design. It isconcluded that senior
management must be aware of the broad implicationsof information systems adoption in
their organizations, and understandthe potential for designers to use systems as sources of
power.
The case is significant as it is evaluated from the perspectiveof both user groups, using a
framework derived from the literatureon systems implementation and information
systems failure. Thestudy shows how a single system can be a success and a
failuresimultaneously.

University Background
Private University was a new university, with the goal of becomingan institute of higher
education significantly different fromthose existing in the public sector at the time. It was
the administrativestaff's responsibility to establish the organizational structureand
systems that would allow the university to meet this objective.

System Implementation and Development
The implementation of an automated student information systemwas recognized as an
essential administrative task. The universitywas in an ideal position to implement a
system successfully. Therewas no existing system to replace and as the university had
noestablished routines and administrative procedures, it was expectedto be easy to install
a system to meet the university's needs.After an intensive search, a system used in many
American universitieswas purchased. The system met the university's basic needs
butwould require much customization.
The system development process was under the jurisdiction of theregistrar, who was
responsible for daily operations, future modificationsand maintenance. The development

team consisted of three individuals,two with extensive university experience and one who
was a skilledprogrammer. This team worked closely with the registrar to
determineadministrative procedures, andspent much time designing the individual
components of the system.
The system was developed by the project team alone, with no inputfrom other users, who
were fully occupied with their own responsibilities.The functions that were being
developed initially were ones thatwould remain within the jurisdiction of the registrar's
office,thus the exclusion of other users from the design process wasperhaps
understandable.
However, subsequent design stages involved information and processesessential to the
secondary users who would need to use the systemextensively. But the design process
was entrenched, allowing noopportunity for these users to have input into the system,
ormore importantly, into the design of the processes that were beinginstitutionalized by
the implementation of the system. The entiresystem was designed with minimal input
from secondary users, whowere presented with a finished product and an indication thatit
was not open to modification. Aware that a student record systemof some sort was
essential, users were forced to accept the systemas provided, even though it was barely
adequate and had many shortcomings.
How did primary and secondary users evaluate this system? Theregistrar's office (primary
users) maintained control of the system,and was responsible for all data input, regardless
of the natureof the data. Read-only access was granted to secondary users whorequired
information on current and prospective students. Theseusers were not, however, able to
generate reports, search thedatabase, or download information. The registrar's staff had
fullaccess to the database, and were to provide the other users withadditional information
on request. But was this situation satisfactory?Could the system be considered a success?

Two Perspectives on Private University's Information System
Literature on systems failure and successful systems implementationwas reviewed to
determine evaluation criteria for system implementationprojects (see full paper for the
details of this review). Twelvecriteria were identified for use in evaluating the
university'ssystem, using the work of Ackoff (1967), Bostrom and Heinen (1977),Schmitt
and Kozar (1978), Senn (1978), Ginzberg (1981), Daviset al. (1992), DeLone and
McLean (1992) and Pollalis and Frieze(1993).
Evaluation Criterion

Primary
Users'
Perspective

Secondary
Users'
Perspective

Primary
Users'
Assessment

Secondary
Users'
Assessment

Was the project
terminated?

No

No

Success

Success

Was it agreed that the
project was a failure?

No

Uncertain

Success

Uncertain

Did the users resist the
system?

No

Yes

Success

Failure

Were the users satisfied
Yes
with the system's scope?

Uncertain

Success

Uncertain

Was the system
designed to meet users'
needs?

Yes

No

Success

failure

Was the quality of the
information system
acceptable?

Yes

Not entirely

Success

Failure

Was the information
produced by the system
of acceptable quality?

Yes

Sometimes

Success

Failure

Was the information
used?

Yes

Not always

Success

Failure

Did the information
impact upon
management decisions?

Yes

Sometimes

Success

Failure

Did the information
impact organizational
performance?

Yes

Lack of info.
had a negative
impact

Success

Failure

Did senior management
Yes
support the system?

No

Success

Failure

Was the system able to
evolve with a changing
organizational
environment?

Uncertain

Success

Failure

Yes

The table shows two vastly different assessments of the system.As expected, the system
designers and primary users consideredthe system to be a success on most criteria. In
stark contrast,the staff in the faculties and the marketing office viewed thesystem as
inadequate and unresponsive to their needs. From theirperspective, the system was a
failure.

Analysis
Was the misfit between the secondary users' system requirementsand the system as
implemented intentional or was it because ofthe technical limitations of the system?
Because users were led to believe that the system was technicallycomplex, they did not
demand access to it immediately. The developersallowed users no access to system

documentation, thereby perpetuatingthe myth of technical complexity and discouraging
users from learningthe true capabilities of the system. The control that the
developersexerted over system access is indicative of a faulty design process.By their
refusal to accord users the necessary access privilegesfor effective system use, the
systems designers exhibited a TheoryX view of the system users (Bostrom and Heinen,
1977). But didthe designers restrict system access because they felt secondaryusers were
incompetent, or was there another motive? At this earlystage of the university's
development the designers were extremelybusy developing and implementing
administrative procedures andacademic policies. However, by allowing the secondary
users accessto the database, a portion of their excessive workload could havebeen
reduced. The secondary users were not looking to input orchange data, they merely
required access to useful data for administrativepurposes. To them it was
incomprehensible that direct access tothe system was denied, as it would reduce the
workload of theadministrative staff.
To understand this apparent paradox, it is instructive to considerthe structure of Private
University, and to understand the implicationsof funding this university on tuition fees
alone.
The diagram on the next page shows the organizational structureof Private University,
with the faculty and administrative links.It also shows, indirectly, the division between
revenue generatorsand expense generators. Tuition revenues were earned by the
faculties.Although the support services of the offices were essential ingenerating
enrollments, the administrative offices were consideredcost centers. When funds were
abundant, faculties worked in closecooperation with the administration, sharing the
common goal ofexcellence in education. But the bankruptcy of the university'sfounder
just prior to the university's opening created a splitin the ranks. The faculties became
critical of the expenses generatedby the administration, and demanded significant cuts in
staffinglevels. Administrative managers effectively lost control of theirbudgets, as they
were forced to comply with the wishes of thefaculties. The centralized nature of the
university's structurecame under fire, with the faculties suggesting that they couldbetter
provide the centralized administrative services themselves.

The administrators were defenseless and had little choice butto comply with the requests
of the faculties. The student informationsystem, however, was one area where the
administration could retaincontrol and resist faculty demands. The deans were generally
unawareof the system's capabilities, and despite pleas from their staffto gain more control
over the system, deans showed little interestin its management, thus allowing the
registrar's staff to usethe information system as a potent political tool.
By controlling access to the system, the registrar's staff becameindispensable. Granted,
there was a need for central maintenanceof student information, but control was not what
secondary userssought. They simply required access to the information. By denyingthis
access, the registrar's staff created a power base aroundthe system. The faculties could
not decentralize the student informationsystem, and thus were subjected to the power
plays of the registrar'sstaff.

A Political Perspective on the System Development
Markus's (1983) use of interaction theory to examine the politicalaspects of systems
design is instructive here. She suggests thatinformation systems failure is "because of an
interactionbetween the characteristics related to the people and characteristicsrelated to
the system". There were no inherent power implicationsin the system used in this case. It
was in determining accessprivileges to the system that power issues arose. As
gatekeepers,the primary users could exert power over the secondary users,power that
could not otherwise be derived from their positionin a non-revenue generating office.
The registrar's office denied access to the system for technicalreasons. Yet they used a
simple, accessible report writer to generatethe data requested by secondary users. If the
secondary usershad been granted access to this system, the primary users in theregistrar's
office would have ceded their sole source of power.
Markus and Bj¿rn-Andersen (1987) discuss the exercise ofpower by IS professionals over
users. This is precisely what occurredin this case. Markus and Bj¿rn-Andersen could be
describingthe design team in noting: "IS professionals exercise powerover user behavior
by creating organizational structures and routineoperating procedures that give them
formal authority over usersor foster user dependence on them for important resources."

Conclusion
What can be learned from this case study? It is clear that systemsdesigners can exert
significant power over users through the structureof system-organization interaction. The
power exerted at PrivateUniversity was not a function of the technology employed, butof
organizational politics.
The systems designers were able to use the system as a politicaltool because the senior
managers were unaware of its importanceto those who most needed it, and of its potency
for providingessential information. This case highlights the necessity forsenior
management to understand the technology implemented intheir organizations. As Ackoff

(1967) notes, "No MIS shouldever be installed unless the managers for whom it is
intendedare trained to evaluate and hence control it, rather than be controlledby it".
This case also shows that information systems should fit the environmentin which they
operate. The gatekeeping role played by the designerswas not appropriate in an
atmosphere where all offices had tobe responsive to faculty needs. The university needed
a systemthat encouraged the users to work toward common goals, ratherthan one that
allowed one group of users to play political gamesand exert power over another.
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